2006; . Because these studies did not explicitly present the cooccurrence information as invalid, they only suggest that when there are two conflicting sources of information, the co-occurrence information has a stronger effect on automatic than on deliberate evaluation.
There are a few studies that did clarify the validity of the co-occurring affective stimuli by explicitly stating that the co-occurring affective stimuli do not characterize the targets. These studies found, contrary to the discrepancy hypothesis, that when the validity information was provided before or immediately after presenting the co-occurrence, validity information had the same effect on automatic and deliberate evaluation (Boucher & Rydell, 2012; Peters & Gawronski, 2011; Siegel, Sigall, & Huber, 2012) . The lack of discrepancy found between automatic and deliberate evaluation in studies that provided co-occurrence and validity information at the same time might be interpreted as evidence that automatic evaluation is as sensitive to validity information as deliberate evaluation. However, it is possible that in studies that provided the validity information together with the co-occurrence, the validity information prevented the formation of an association between the target and the co-occurring stimuli. The discrepancy assumption pertains to the expression of evaluative response, not to the formation of mental representations. Therefore, in order to test the discrepancy assumption, it is essential that the participants form associations between the target object and valence that does not characterize the target. Then, the experiment should test whether that association has a stronger influence on automatic than on deliberate evaluation.
One method to induce association formation is to delay the validity information until after the participants have been exposed to the co-occurrence information. Indeed, studies that employed that method provide the only existing evidence for different sensitivity of automatic versus deliberate evaluation to explicit validity information. In one demonstration, Peters and Gawronski (2011) presented two target men with negative behavioral descriptions and two with positive behaviors.
After participants learned about all the behaviors of four men, they were provided with information whether the behavioral descriptions characterized or mischaracterized the target person. One man occurred with positive behaviors that characterized him, and one occurred with characteristic negative behaviors. The other two men co-occurred with behaviors presented as uncharacteristic of them: one with positive behaviors and one with negative behaviors. In their self-reported evaluation, participants preferred the man who co-occurred with negative behaviors that were uncharacteristic of him over the man who co-occurred with positive behaviors that were uncharacteristic of him. In contrast, the automatic evaluation measure-the Evaluative Priming Task (EPT; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) -found no evidence for preference between these two targets.
In the other relevant study, participants first learned about two groups, one described favorably and the other unfavorably (Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006) . Then, participants completed measures of deliberate and automatic evaluations of the two groups. After the first measurement, new information revealed to the participants that the previous information was mixed-up, and each group was in fact characterized by the information provided about the other group. Finally, the deliberate and automatic evaluations of the two social groups were measured again. The self-reported preference between the two groups was reversed after participants received the validity information. By contrast, the automatic evaluation measure-the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007) -showed the initial preference.
In summary, two studies have found evidence suggesting that automatic evaluation is less sensitive than deliberate evaluation to changes in the perceived validity of the co-occurrence information. This is the only direct evidence that in comparison to deliberate evaluation, automatic evaluation is less sensitive to explicit validity information.
Alternative Explanations for the Existing Evidence
The results observed by Peters and Gawronski (2011) and Gregg et al. (2006) , are open to alternative explanations not relevant to the discrepancy hypothesis. The discrepancy found by Peters and Gawronski could be explained by reduced overall sensitivity of the automatic measure in comparison to the deliberate evaluation measure. In their research, Peters and Gawronski found that the self-reported preference between the positive and negative men was weaker when the co-occurring information was uncharacteristic of the men compared to when it was characteristic of them. Moreover, this preference was the weakest in the delayed validity information condition -the only condition that showed a discrepancy between automatic and deliberate evaluation. Therefore, perhaps the induced preference in the invalid cooccurrence condition was too weak to be detected with the automatic evaluation measure, even if it was there. The EPT for automatic evaluation assessment often shows relatively low reliability, usually below α = .6 (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014; Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014; Olson & Fazio, 2003) . As a consequence, the observed difference could be a function of less reliable automatic versus deliberate measures, and not a difference in the measured evaluative associations (see Buchner & Wippich, 2000 , for similar difficulty in research on implicit versus explicit memory).
In Gregg et al.'s study, the main research question pertained to attitude change, rather than to the effect of (in)validity information. Because of that, the attitudes were measured before and after providing the validity information.
Participants completed the IAT and a self-report measure before knowing that the cooccurrence information was invalid. That experience could itself have strengthened the automatic evaluation making it more resistant to counterattitudinal information.
The results could suggest that after people express evaluation deliberately and automatically, it is easier to reverse deliberate than automatic evaluation.
To summarize, the results found by Peters and Gawronski (2011) and Gregg et al. (2006) are the best existing evidence that explicit validity information can have distinct effects on automatic versus deliberate evaluation, at least when the validity information is not provided immediately with the co-occurrence information.
However, perhaps because the main focus of the previous research was not the effect of delayed validity information on evaluation, there are plausible alternative explanations for each of those findings. Because our literature review reveals that this evidence is unique and important, a more definitive test of the effect of delayed validity information on evaluation is needed.
The Present Research
We combined the learning procedures used by Peters and Gawronski and by Gregg et al. to pursue a more definitive test of the discrepancy hypothesis. Like Peters and Gawronski, we asked participants to form impressions of four novel target men, each presented with verbal descriptions of positive or negative behaviors. Then, we used Gregg et al.'s mix-up manipulation, and informed participants that, accidentally, the behaviors attributed to one man were actually performed by the other, and vice versa (see also . The advantage of a mix-up manipulation is that it informs participants that the mischaracterized men actually performed negative or positive behaviors-just like the two men who co-occurred with behaviors that they actually performed.
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Additionally, we added a memory measure to make sure that participants understood the information regarding the validity of the previous pairing and remembered the valence of the behaviors that each target actually performed. And, we also tested the results after removing participants with inaccurate comprehension.
Finally, to improve the automatic evaluation measurement we tested the effect of the same learning procedure on three different automatic measures. In Experiments 1a-1b, we used the EPT, in Experiments 2a-2b we used the IAT, and in Experiments 3a-3b we used the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) . For each measure type, we report the results of the main experiment (Experiment a) and the results of a close replication (Experiment b). We conducted all experiments with large samples for high-powered designs to maximize sensitivity and precision of effect estimation 1 .
Experiments 1a-1b

Method
Participants. Participants in all six experiments were volunteers at the Project Implicit research website (Nosek, 2005) , who registered for research and were randomly assigned to the study from a pool of available studies 2 . Of the 393 participants who completed Experiment 1a, we excluded five participants who had more than 40% error trials in the EPT (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014) . The final sample of Experiment 1a included 388 participants (67% women, Mage = 30.86, SDage = 14.11).
Of the 153 participants who completed the relevant conditions in Experiment 1b 3 , we excluded five participants because they had more than 40% error trials in the EPT.
The final sample of Experiment 1b included 148 participants (57% women, Mage = 30.54, SDage = 13.14).
Materials and procedure.
Stimuli. The four targets were pictures of four males selected from an open database of facial stimuli (Minear & Park, 2004 Experiment1b, the roles of the four men were completely randomized. 4 The order of the behaviors was randomly chosen for each participant.
4 In Experiments 1a, 2a and 3a, the assignment of men to roles was randomized with the constraint that David and Michael always shared validity condition. We applied that constraint because the automatic evaluation measure always measured attitudes only toward David and Michael, and we were not interested in comparisons of men that did not share the same validity condition. In Experiments 1b, 2b and 3b, the roles of the four men were completely randomized, leading to some conditions that did not compare men that shared the same validity condition. Because the conditions that did not compare men of the same validity condition were irrelevant to the present research question (and, in retrospect, were hardly informative), we omitted these results from this report (they appear in supplementary web materials, at https://osf.io/2buh7/).
After reading all 32 behaviors, participants read the validity information:
A few minutes after Lisa tells you all those facts about your four co-workers, Design. In all the experiments, the validity factor was manipulated between participants (the evaluation measures included either the men who co-occurred with characteristic behaviors or those who co-occurred with uncharacteristic behaviors) and the measure type factor was manipulated within participants (each participant completed the EPT and the self-report). Excluding the many counterbalancing procedural parameters, the design was 2 (valid or invalid condition; between participants) X 2 (automatic or deliberate measure; within participants).
Results and Discussion
Data processing. Following previous work with this data source (Bar-Anan, 2010), EPT analyses were based on log-transformed response latencies, excluding trials with incorrect responses (5.84%, 6.54% of the trials in Experiments 1a and 1b, respectively), responses faster than 300 ms (0.2%, 0.19% of the trials), and responses with latency more than 2.5 SDs away from the participant's average latency in each prime-target condition (3.17%, 2.96% of the trials) 6 .
The average latency (in ms) for each condition in the EPT for each condition in the experiments are presented in Table 1 . For each of the two primes, the mean reaction time to trials with positive words was subtracted from the mean reaction time to trials with negative words to create evaluation score of the prime target. However, that evaluation score is biased because people are usually faster to categorize positive than negative words (Wentura & Degner, 2010) . Therefore, the important EPT score was the difference between the two evaluation scores, representing the preference between the two men.
Evaluation
The main hypothesis we tested in this research is that deliberate evaluation is more sensitive than automatic evaluation to (delayed) validity information. To overcome alternative accounts related to weaker reliability of the EPT, we identified a comparison that should show stronger effect for EPT than for self-report if validity information has a stronger impact on self-report. We used the preference for the truly positive man over the truly negative man as the dependent variable. In the invalid condition (when the men co-occurred with uncharacteristic behaviors), people must use the validity information (the information that the behaviors were mixed-up) to form a preference for the truly positive man over the truly negative man. Therefore, measures that are less sensitive to validity information would show smaller preference for the truly positive person over the truly negative person in the invalid condition than in the valid condition (i.e., would show a stronger effect of validity information).
According to the discrepancy hypothesis, the self-report would successfully account for the validity information and show no (or little) difference between the two preferences. The EPT would be less sensitive to the validity information and show a larger difference between the two preferences.
We submitted the preference for the truly positive man over the truly negative man to a 2 (measure: self-report, EPT, within participants) x 2 (valid or invalid condition, between participants) mixed ANOVA. The discrepancy hypothesis predicts an interaction due to stronger effect of the validity factor on the EPT than on the selfreport, reflecting stronger effect of invalid co-occurrence on the EPT than on the selfreport. Figure 1 (panels A1 and A2) illustrates this analysis in Experiments 1a and 1b. no evidence that the automatic evaluation was less sensitive to validity information than the deliberate evaluation; only that it was less sensitive to any information overall.
Although we found no evidence that the two measures were different in their sensitivity to validity information, another interesting question is the influence of invalid co-occurrence on each measure separately. Notes. Standard deviations are in bracket; For the deliberate evaluation, preference is the self-reported evaluation of the negative man subtracted from the self-reported evaluation of the positive man; For the EPT, although we present latency in ms for clarity, the analysis used log transformed latencies; Preference is the difference (the mean reaction time to trials with positive words subtracted from the mean reaction time to trials with negative words) of the negative man subtracted from the difference of the positive man; Preference scores significantly different from zero are presented with asterisks (
Comprehension of the validity information. We averaged the four comprehension items to compute a comprehension score regarding the information about each of the four target persons. The score ranged from 3 (correct response with certainty) to -3 (incorrect response with certainty In summary, in Experiments 1a-1b we did not find evidence that automatic evaluation is less sensitive to explicit validity information than the deliberate evaluation. However, that (null) finding can also be attributed to the low reliability of the EPT. With the present analysis strategy, we tested whether the automatic preference for the truly positive man over the truly negative man would be more sensitive to (in)validity information than the self-reported preference. Perhaps that difference exists, but is not easily detected with the EPT. As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 (panels A1c and A2c), the EPT found no preference between the two men when the co-occurring behaviors were uncharacteristic of the target men. Perhaps the lack of preference reflects sensitivity to invalid co-occurrence but the EPT fails to detect it due to low reliability. Materials and procedure. The material and procedure were identical to Experiments 1a-1b except that we used the IAT as the automatic measure.
Automatic evaluation. In the IAT, participants categorize stimuli using two computer keys. In the critical blocks, participants respond with the left key to stimuli of two categories (e.g., "Michael" and "Good words"), and with the right key to stimuli of two other categories (e.g., "David" and "Bad words"). In two of these blocks Michael and Good words shared the same response key, and in the other two critical blocks, David and Good words shared the same response key. When "Michael" and "Good words" shared the same key, people with more positive associations for Michael than David should respond more quickly. Therefore, the difference between the average response latencies in blocks that assigned Michael and Good words to the same key and blocks that assigned David and Good words to the same key is interpreted as automatic preference. The seven-block IAT followed the procedure described in Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2005 were succuessfully used in many IATs in the Project Implicit website . Based on the IAT scores from four parcels of the IAT critical blocks, internal consistency was α = .84, .75, in Experiment 2a and 2b respectively, in the valid condition, and α = .85, .83 in the invalid condition.
Design. Excluding counterbalancing procedural parameters, the design was 2 (valid or invalid condition; between participants) X 2 (automatic or deliberate measure; within participants).
Results and Discussion
Data processing. The average latency (in ms) for each condition in the IAT for each condition in the experiments are presented in Table 2 . For each participant we computed an IAT D score (Greenwald et al., 2003) such that positive score indicated a preference for David over Michael. For the main analysis, we standardized those preference scores, and then re-coded them to reflect a preference for the man whose true valence was positive over the man whose true valence was negative.
Evaluation. Figure 1 (panels B1 and B2) illustrates the standardized and raw preference scores in each condition. We submitted the standardized preference scores to a 2 (measure) x 2 (validity) mixed ANOVA. Further, preferences were stronger with the self-report measure compared to the IAT, information. Difficulty in reversing the preference reflects reduced sensitivity to validity information. Therefore, the interaction reflected weaker sensitivity of the IAT to validity information in comparison to the self-report's sensitivity. As detailed in Notes. Standard deviations are in bracket; For the deliberate evaluation, preference is the self-reported evaluation of the negative man subtracted from the self-reported evaluation of the positive man; For the IAT, the compatible block was the block in which the positive man shared response key with positive words; Preference scores and D scores that were significantly different from zero are presented with asterisks ( Unlike Experiments 1a-1b, Experiments 2a-b's results were consistent with the hypothesis that deliberate evaluation is more sensitive than automatic evaluation to explicit validity information. Nonetheless, the IAT still showed some sensitivity to the validity information by showing a preference for the truly positive man over the truly negative man even when each man co-occurred with opposite valence (Table 2 ). This suggests that the difference is a matter of degree rather than complete insensitivity of automatic evaluation.
The inconsistency in results between Experiments 1a-b and 2a-b could be the result of the low reliability of the EPT compared to the IAT. Alternatively, it might reflect differences in the processes and mental constructs that influence each measure Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014 
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure were identical to
Experiments 1a-1b and 2a-2b except that we used the AMP as the automatic measure.
Automatic evaluation. Each trial of the AMP displayed stimuli in the following sequence: A photograph of one of the two targets appeared for 100 ms,
followed by a blank screen for 100 ms, followed by a Chinese pictograph for 100 ms, followed by a pattern mask of black-and-white noise that appeared until participants responded. Upon presentation of the mask the participants indicated if the Chinese pictograph is more pleasant or more unpleasant than the average Chinese pictograph using two response keys on the keyboard signifying pleasant and unpleasant. Design. Excluding the counterbalanced procedural parameters, the design of Experiment 3 was 2 (valid or invalid condition; between participants) X 2 (automatic or deliberate measure; within participants).
Results and Discussion
Data processing. .001. Importantly, that interaction is the opposite to the discrepancy hypothesis: it means that in that particular measures order, the AMP was slightly better than the self-report measure in reversing the preference when validity information indicated that the co-occurrence was uncharacteristic of the men.
As detailed in Table 3 , like the IAT in Experiments 2a-2b, with the AMP we found reliable preference for the truly positive man over the truly negative man, even in the invalid condition, in which validity information was essential for forming the preference. However, unlike the IAT, when measured with the AMP, that preference was not smaller than the preference formed in the valid condition, in which the validity information was not required for the preference formation, Experiment 3a:
F(1, 500) = 0.31, p = .580, ηp 2 < .001; Experiment 3b: F(1, 174) = 3.36, p = .068, ηp 2 = .01. Numerically, even the self-report showed more sensitivity to the co-occurrence information, with smaller preference in the invalid condition than in the valid condition, Experiment 3a: F(1, 500) = 7.63, p = .006, ηp 2 = .01; Experiment 3b: F(1, 174) = 10.50, p = .001, ηp 2 = .05. Notes. Standard deviations are in bracket; For the deliberate evaluation, preference is the self-reported evaluation of the negative man subtracted from the self-reported evaluation of the positive man; For the AMP, we show proportions of pleasant responses for each target man in each condition, and preference scores (the difference between the proportions); Preference scores significantly different from zero are presented with asterisks ( 
General Discussion
The hypothesis that deliberate evaluation is more sensitive than automatic evaluation to the validity of co-occurrence information is central to most contemporary theories of evaluation (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006 Petty et al., 2007; .
Surprisingly, direct support of that hypothesis is scarce with the best existing contribution coming from experiments that provided the validity information well after all the co-occurrence information (Gregg, et al., 2006; Peters & Gawronski, 2011) .
Given the importance of this hypothesis, we conducted six experiments that combined procedures from the previous experiments to manipulate co-occurrence and validity independently: four men were paired with positive or negative behaviors.
Then, participants learned that the pairing was not always valid evidence that the men and the behaviors paired with each of them were the same valence. Participants learned that a man paired with positive behaviors and a man paired with negative behaviors actually performed each other's behaviors. In all six experiments, we tested whether deliberate evaluation would be more sensitive than automatic evaluation to the information about the co-occurrence validity. The key difference between the experiments was the automatic evaluation measure: EPT in Experiments 1a-1b, IAT in Experiments 2a-2b, and AMP in Experiments 3a-3b.
We observed that automatic evaluation was less sensitive than deliberate evaluation to delayed validity information with only one measure, the IAT. When automatic evaluation was measured with the EPT or with the AMP, automatic and deliberate evaluations were similarly sensitive to validity information. These results suggest both evidence consistent and inconsistent with the hypothesis depending on the measure used 7 .
7 The failure of the EPT and the AMP to support the discrepancy assumption (a null result) is probably not for lack of statistical power. The interaction effect found with the IAT was ηp 2 = .03 in Experiment 2a, and ηp 2 = .06 in Experiment 2b. As detailed in Table 4 , for an effect size of ηp 2 = .02, the probability of stumbling on a Type II error in both the first experiment and its replication was 1% for the EPT experiments and for the AMP experiments. Therefore, it is unlikely that lack of statistical power was the reason for our failure to find reliable evidence for the discrepancy hypothesis in any of the four experiments that did not use the IAT. Notes. The replications were Experiments 1b and 3b. The Both column presents the chances to detect the moderation effect in at least one of the two experiments.
Explanations for the Results
To improve the ability to generalize from our results, we used multiple No discrepant sensitivity. Previous research found that when explicit information about the validity of the co-occurring affective stimuli is presented before or immediately after presenting the co-occurrence, validity information has the same effect on automatic and deliberate evaluation (Boucher & Rydell, 2012; Peters & Gawronski, 2011; Siegel, et al., 2012) . If delayed validity information also has the same influence on automatic and deliberate evaluation, the only relevant evidence left for different effects of evaluative learning on automatic versus deliberate evaluation would come from studies that did not explicitly inform participants that the cooccurrence information is not valid (e.g., Moran & Bar-Anan, 2013) .
If the present EPT and AMP results are a better reflection of automatic evaluation than the IAT results, then most contemporary evaluation models require revision to explain why explicit validity information has the same effect on deliberate and automatic evaluation. One possibility could be that people are generally good in using validity information to form new evaluative associations. Support for that possibility comes from the finding that both automatic and deliberate evaluation are reversed after people receive new information that changes the meaning of earlier information (Mann & Ferguson, 2015; Wyer, 2010) . Perhaps only when the validity information is not explicit (e.g., Moran & Bar-Anan, 2013; , validity is not used immediately for revising evaluations, new evaluative associations are not formed, and automatic/deliberate discrepancy emerges.
Confirmation of the discrepant sensitivity assumption. A second alternative is that the IAT results reflect true discrepancy between deliberate and automatic evaluative processes in their sensitivity to invalid co-occurrence. In that case, contemporary evaluation theories are correct in their hypothesis regarding automatic/deliberate discrepancies, but better theories about attitude measurements are required to explain why the EPT and the AMP failed to show the discrepancy.
Previous research had already suggested that task-specific mechanisms can influence the effects revealed by different indirect measures of evaluation Gawronski et al., 2010) . Another possibility is that the AMP is more sensitive than the IAT to deliberate evaluative processes. In a comparison of seven indirect measures, the AMP was the only indirect measure not related to any of the other indirect measures more strongly than to self-report measures (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014) . The AMP also showed evidence that it is sensitive to evaluative processes only when participants (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014) . Perhaps all three measures are sensitive to automatic evaluative processes, but not to the same processes.
One relevant difference between the three measures is that the IAT's different conditions are manipulated between blocks while they are intermixed within blocks in the EPT and the AMP. Unlike the EPT and the AMP, the IAT compares performance under task rules that are constant in different blocks of the task. Therefore, participants' performance in the IAT can improve if they focus on associations that fit the task rules in each block Rothermund et al., 2005) . In the present case, participants could recode the man categories according to co-occurrence (Michael is recoded to good because he co-occurred with positive behaviors) or true valence (Michael is recoded to bad because the validity information suggested that he is a negative person). In other words, perhaps both co-occurring valence and true valence contribute to automatic evaluation, but in cases that the two are in conflict, only the IAT (but not the AMP or the EPT) can capture the contribution of cooccurrence to automatic evaluation.
Sensitivity of Evaluation to Validity Information
Another important finding of the present investigation is that nearly all the measures in all the experiments and all samples showed a weaker preference when participants had to reverse the evaluation implied by the co-occurrence (e.g., the invalid condition) than when the co-occurrence was valid evaluative information.
Importantly, deliberate evaluation consistently showed sensitivity to the invalid cooccurrence. Further, the IAT and the AMP showed sensitivity to validity information: a reliable preference for the man who co-occurrence with uncharacteristic negative behaviors over the man who co-occurred with uncharacteristic positive behavior.
Thus, although the present investigation leaves open questions regarding the effect of validity on automatic versus deliberate evaluation, the results clearly show that deliberate evaluation is sensitive to invalid co-occurrence, whereas automatic evaluation is sensitive to validity information. In light of these findings, evaluation theories can no longer assume that deliberate evaluation completely ignores associations if they are based on co-occurrence with valence that is explicitly known to be the opposite of the target's valence (for more on that issue, see Moran, BarAnan, & Nosek, in press ). And, evaluation theories also can no longer assume that validity information does not influence automatic evaluation. Our research suggests that if there is a difference between the sensitivity of automatic and deliberate evaluation to invalid co-occurrence, it is probably a matter of degree rather than an all-or-none relationship.
Future Directions
The present results identify productive new questions to investigate regarding the effect of validity information on automatic and deliberate evaluation. One is to test this question with other learning procedures to clarify moderators of sensitivity of automatic and deliberate evaluation to validity information and to co-occurrence. One factor might be participants' processing goals during learning. In the present research, the instructions guided the participants to memorize the information and to form impressions of the men. If participants have only one of these goals, the effect of invalid co-occurrence might change. For example, Moran, Bar-Anan, and Nosek (2015) directly manipulated processing goals and used a different learning procedure.
They found that an impression formation goal increased the sensitivity of evaluation to validity information, whereas a memorization goal decreased the sensitivity of evaluation to validity information. This occurred for both automatic and deliberate evaluation. There was no discrepancy between automatic and deliberate evaluation in their sensitivity to the processing goal moderator. However, these results were obtained in a learning procedure that did not provide explicit validity information.
Therefore, whether that pattern replicates when validity information is provided explicitly, after a delay, is still unknown.
Another possible moderator is the explicitness or directness of the validity information. The present research focused on explicit information whether the co-RUNNING HEAD: VALIDITY AND AUTOMATIC EVALUATION 30 occurrence is valid evidence of similarity between the co-occurring stimuli. Previous research that found discrepant sensitivity of automatic and deliberate evaluation to invalid co-occurrence did not use such explicit instructions (e.g., Moran & Bar-Anan, 2013; . Therefore, an important next step is to manipulate the explicitness of the validity information. This will show whether the sensitivity of deliberate versus automatic evaluation becomes more discrepant when the instructions are less explicit.
An unresolved mystery of the present research is why the indirect measures Finally, perhaps the most important future research direction is to measure behavioral outcomes that are known to reflect automatic evaluation. If co-occurrence without validity shows stronger influence on a behavior known to reflect automatic evaluation than on behavior known to reflect deliberate evaluation, that would provide strong support for the theoretical assumption tested in the present research. Although many studies have found that some behaviors are related to automatic evaluation measures more than to self-reported measures (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2002; Friese et al., 2009) , there are hardly any evaluative learning studies that used such behaviors as a measure for discrepancy between the formation of automatic versus deliberate evaluation (for a rare exception, see Rydell and McConnell, 2006, Experiment 4) .
From our experience, behavioral measures are difficult to administrate and often suffer from low reliability and validity. Nevertheless, such measures are essential for corroborating claims of discrepant formation of deliberate versus automatic evaluation (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014) .
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Summary
The present research tested the assumption that deliberate evaluation is more sensitive than automatic evaluation to the validity of co-occurrence information. We found support for this assumption only when automatic evaluation was measured with the Implicit Association Test. The present results cast doubt on the discrepant sensitivity hypothesis, and call for more research to confirm (or dispute) this central hypothesis. The results emphasize the importance of advancing current knowledge about the specific evaluative constructs that influence each indirect measure. In fact, there is hardly any evaluative learning research that compared the sensitivity of different indirect measures to specific evaluative learning histories. The results of the present research also emphasize the need of using multiple automatic evaluation and behavioral measures in the investigation of the formation of deliberate versus automatic evaluation.
